The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms
研究越南转型经济中家族企业、非家族企业和前国有企业的绩效差异，发现政治关联CEO和董事会强度影响这些差异，家族企业通常表现更好。
Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.