The electoral bias: the political economy of subnational transfers in Latin America
研究了巴西、墨西哥、哥伦比亚和智利的地方转移支付是否被用于获取选举优势，发现存在选举周期波动和偏向结盟市镇的操纵，但各国差异显著。
This article examines whether transfers to local governments in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile have been allocated to obtain electoral advantage. A large panel data set and fixed-effects estimations uncover two types of manipulations: grant fluctuations along the municipal election cycle and biases towards aligned municipalities. Notwithstanding, there are significant cross-country differences. In Brazil, Colombia and Chile, mayors aligned with the central government coalition systematically benefit, especially ahead of elections, whereas in Mexico, political budget cycles do not discriminate in terms of partisanship. These results point to institutional conditions and the nature of electoral competition shaping distributive politics.