Porter Hypothesis vs Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Can There Be Environmental Policies Getting Two Eggs in One Basket?
研究了能否设计出同时消除企业外迁动机并激励其实现双赢解决方案的环境政策，在古诺重复博弈框架下分析了排放税和环境标准两种政策工具。
Abstract The Porter hypothesis and the pollution haven hypothesis seem to predict opposite reactions by firms facing environmental regulation, as the first invokes the arising of a win–win solution while the second envisages the possibility for firms to flee abroad. We illustrate the possibility of designing policies (taking the form of either emission taxation or environmental standards) able to eliminate firms’ incentives to relocate their plants abroad and create a parallel incentive for them to deliver a win–win solution by investing either in replacement technologies under emission taxation, or in abatement technologies under an environmental standard. This is worked out in a Cournot supergame in which firms may activate the highest level of collusion compatible with their intertemporal preferences.