Social Networks and the Informational Role of Financial Advisory Firms Centrality in Mergers and Acquisitions
研究发现，在并购中处于社交网络更中心位置的金融咨询公司能获取更多信息流，为客户带来更高的公告异常回报和长期运营绩效，同时降低信息不对称和收购溢价，但自身也收取更高费用。
Abstract This paper examines the role of the social network hierarchy of financial advisory firms in a mergers and acquisitions (M&As) framework. Financial advisors are information intermediaries who play an information extraction and information dissemination role. The more central the advisory firm is within the network of advisory firms, the greater their access to information flows. Our findings indicate that more central advisors are associated with higher acquirer announcement abnormal returns, higher abnormal combined returns and higher operating long‐run performance for the new entity. Central advisors also mitigate information asymmetries, resulting in lower premium paid by bidders. In return, more central advisory firms demand higher advisory fees, engage in higher M&A activity and are more likely to advise large acquirers and acquisitions of large and public deals. Our results are robust to endogeneity and self‐selection concerns.