Debt covenants and asset versus equity acquisitions
研究发现，存在贷款契约的公司更倾向于进行资产收购而非股权收购，这种倾向在债务契约强度高、代理问题严重、盈利能力低以及行业竞争激烈的公司中更为明显。
Abstract We examine whether the presence of loan covenants leads firms to choose either an asset or equity acquisitions. Asset acquisitions involve the selective purchase of a target company's assets, and equity acquisitions involve acquisitions of common stocks. We document that firms with loan covenants are more likely to engage in asset acquisitions as opposed to equity acquisitions. Our results are robust to alternative measures of loan covenants and to endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the association between loan covenants and asset acquisitions is stronger among firms with greater debt covenant intensity, more severe agency problems, and lower profitability. Acquirers facing more intense competition within their industries are also likely to choose asset acquisitions. Our findings suggest that acquirers' incentives to avoid wealth transfer at the expense of debtholders drive the relation between debt covenants and choice of acquisition structure.