Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring*
分析了在不完全监督下市场透明度如何影响合谋，发现透明度增加在需求侧产生促进竞争效应、在供给侧产生反竞争效应，且供给侧效应通常占主导。
We analyse how market transparency affects collusion under imperfect monitoring where punishment phases occur on the equilibrium path. We show that increased transparency causes a ‘pro‐competitive’ demand‐side effect and an ‘anti‐competitive’ supply‐side effect on the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) profits. When transparency increases on both sides of the market, the optimal SPPE profits unambiguously increase at the perfect monitoring limit, because the pro‐competitive demand‐side effect vanishes. This result holds even when there is minimal structure on the competition game. The supply‐side effect also dominates away from the limit under reasonable conditions. We draw conclusions for policy.