Industry Tournament Incentives
研究了CEO行业锦标赛激励，即本公司CEO与同行业同规模公司中薪酬最高CEO的薪酬差距，发现该差距与公司业绩、风险及投资和财务政策的风险正相关，且在高CEO流动性和高获胜概率时效应更强。
We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar (industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive winning. Received October 21, 2012; editorial decision March 26, 2017 by Editor Laura Starks.