The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”
研究了1870-1914年间，外围国家遵守金本位制如何作为财务诚信信号，降低从西欧核心国家融资的成本，解释了资本输入国坚持金本位的努力。
In this article we argue that during the period from 1870 to 1914 adherence to the gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude, a “good housekeeping seal of approval”, that facilitated access by peripheral countries to capital from the core countries of western Europe. Examination of data from nine widely different capital-importing countries, using a model inspired by the Capital Asset Pricing Model, reveals that countries with poor records of adherence were charged considerably more than those with good records, enough to explain the determined effort to stay on gold made by a number of capital-importing countries.