Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships
研究了团队中两种延迟来源：搭便车和缺乏沟通。合伙人贡献于共同项目价值，但对自己努力的成功有私人信息。当截止日期遥远时，不成功的合伙人搭便车；当截止日期临近时，成功的合伙人停止揭示成功以维持同伴动力。最优截止日期最大化生产性努力并避免不必要延迟。
We study two sources of delay in teams: freeriding and lack of communication. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own efforts. When the deadline is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each others' efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners stop revealing their success to maintain their partners' motivation. We derive comparative statics results for common team performance measures and find that the optimal deadline maximizes productive efforts while avoiding unnecessary delays. Welfare is higher when information is only privately observable rather than revealed to the partnership.