Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage
研究宏观审慎政策如何缓解流动性陷阱：当受约束家庭去杠杆时，利率需下降以刺激需求，但零下限导致需求不足，经济陷入流动性陷阱；事前杠杆决策产生总需求外部性，宏观审慎政策可改善福利，优于利率政策。
We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps. When constrained households engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained households to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this environment, households' ex ante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. Welfare can be improved with macroprudential policies targeted toward reducing leverage. Interest rate policy is inferior to macroprudential policies in dealing with excessive leverage.