CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism
研究CEO合同保护（雇佣协议和离职补偿协议）如何抑制管理者短视行为，发现合同保护能减少企业为保盈利而削减研发支出和进行真实盈余管理，且效果随合同期限和金额增强。
ABSTRACT How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms. JEL Classifications: G32; M40