Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma
用一个金融市场逆向选择的标准模型，研究中央银行贴现窗口的污名现象，发现借款银行可能因使用贴现窗口而支付更高的市场利率，并讨论了污名作为实证现象的相关性。
Abstract I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.