A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
提出一个政治经济学理论，解释立法机构通过所得税和借款筹集收入，用于公共品和猪肉桶支出，政策在常规与负责任制定模式间循环，均衡时税率和债务过高、公共品供给不足。
This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy. Policy choices are made by a legislature that can raise revenues via an income tax and by borrowing. Revenues can be used to finance a public good, whose value is stochastic, and pork-barrel spending. Policymaking cycles between a “business- as-usual” regime in which legislators bargain over pork, and a “responsible policymaking” regime in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. Equilibrium tax rates are too high, public good provision is too low, and debt levels are too high.