Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
研究了当质量具有持续性且可付费认证时，企业建立和维护质量声誉的激励，揭示了过度认证陷阱导致低收益均衡，并探讨了行业认证标准如何帮助企业协调到高收益均衡。
We study firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified at a cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality forever, once it is reached for the first time. They are either lenient or harsh, endowing firms with multiple or one chance to improve and certify quality.