Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France
利用法国失业保险改革，研究发现为失业者创业提供保险显著增加了企业创建数量，且新企业质量未下降，但新企业就业会挤占现有企业就业。
ABSTRACT We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self‐employment. We exploit a large‐scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one‐for‐one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.