Why Do Hedge Funds Avoid Disclosure? Evidence from Confidential 13F Filings
研究对冲基金申请保密处理13F持仓的样本，发现保密持仓在保密期内获得显著正异常收益，且经理更倾向于对易受抢先交易的流动性差持仓申请保密，揭示了减少披露的重要好处。
Abstract We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.