POLICY UNCERTAINTY, ELECTORAL SECURITIES, AND REDISTRIBUTION*
研究当个人可在股市交易政策相关证券时，再分配政策通过的不确定性如何影响政治支持，发现金融市场发达会减少再分配并加剧不平等。
This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy‐contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no “policy‐insurance market” is available. This implies that in economies with well‐developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy‐insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers.