Competition in Loan Contracts
构建无抵押贷款市场模型，多个放贷人同时向借款人提供合同，借款人可接受多份。当违约收益足够高时，零利润均衡无法维持，放贷人获得正利润甚至垄断定价，且竞争加剧不改变此结果。
We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed. If this payoff is high enough, deterministic zero-profit equilibria cannot be sustained. Lenders earn a positive profit, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive-profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit.