Competition and Coalition among Underwriters: The Decision to Join a Syndicate
研究主承销商为何选择组织混合银团（商业银行参与）而非纯投资银行银团，发现混合银团服务客户更小、股票评级更低、更依赖银行贷款，且客户忠诚度高时主承销商更倾向邀请银行参与。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co‐managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.