在#MeToo时代报告性行为不端

Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2022
被引 9
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

研究了性行为不端的报告行为,发现人们因担心他人是否也会报告而少报,且只有当不端行为普遍时才少报;还分析了提高制裁、增强意识等措施的效果及意外后果。

Abstract

We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing confidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or backfire. Managers may avoid mentoring subordinates, spilling over into reporting. A holding tank may discourage reporting by raising the bar to access reports. Overall, we highlight several unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo.

#MeToo 运动战略不确定性举报激励机制