Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information
研究双边市场中平台竞争如何因买卖双方对新技术的价值存在事前不确定性和事后信息不对称而导致市场失灵，发现竞争可能比垄断更糟糕，多归属可解决但排他性交易会引发低效。
We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex ante uncertainty and ex post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower level of trade and lower welfare than a monopoly, if the difference in the degree of asymmetric information between the two sides is below a certain threshold. Multi-homing solves the market failure resulting from asymmetric information. However, if platforms can impose exclusive dealing, then they will do so, which results in market inefficiency.