Mergers in Multidimensional Competition
研究了当企业在研发和产品市场进行多维竞争时，横向并购如何利用研发互补性，发现并购使内部企业受益、外部企业受损，且内部企业规模更大，这与传统市场力量并购模型的结论相反。
Horizontal mergers are often driven by the desire to exploit R&D complementarities. We investigate the positive features of such a merger when oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. For a non‐trivial degree of R&D complementarity, we show that the merger has the following intuitively appealing features independently of the strategic variable in market competition: insiders benefit; outsiders are harmed; and insiders end up larger than outsiders. These results contrast with those of traditional models of merger to achieve market power alone, which are known to be counterintuitive and sensitive to the mode of product market competition.