强制套期保值披露是抑制还是鼓励过度投机?

Do Mandatory Hedge Disclosures Discourage or Encourage Excessive Speculation?

Journal of Accounting Research · 2002
被引 71
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

分析强制套期保值披露对公司风险管理策略的影响,发现透明度可能鼓励过度投机,而缺乏披露虽能促进审慎管理但会扭曲生产决策,对监管者评估披露政策有参考价值。

Abstract

In order to shed some light on the desirability of hedge disclosures, I investigate the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm’s risk management strategy. Several major results emerge from this analysis. First, greater transparency about a firm’s derivative activities is not necessarily a panacea for imprudent risk management strategies. I show that such transparency actually induces the firm to take excessive speculative positions in the derivative market. Second, I show that the firm may choose a prudent risk management strategy in the absence of hedge disclosures. However, the selection of a prudent risk management comes at a cost. The firm’s production policy is distorted in the absence of hedge disclosures. These findings suggest that regulators must carefully investigate the trade‐offs between production distortions and risk management distortions in evaluating the desirability of mandatory hedge disclosures for all firms.

强制套期保值披露过度投机风险管理策略生产扭曲