STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION*
研究了创新收益的不完全占有性如何影响企业投资和披露创新生产力信息的激励，发现极端溢出下完全披露，中间溢出下部分或完全隐藏。
The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free‐rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business‐stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.