Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
研究外部治理（公司控制权市场）与内部治理（股东积极主义）如何相互影响，发现两者互补时能产生显著超额收益，对理解治理机制与股价关系有参考价值。
ABSTRACT We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry‐adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.