A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification
研究了动态随机博弈中马尔可夫完美均衡的一般性质，证明几乎所有此类博弈都有有限个局部孤立的均衡，这些均衡是本质的、强稳定的，并且可以纯化。
This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.