Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration
研究了上游拥有市场势力、下游进行数量竞争时，后向纵向一体化对竞争的影响，发现小规模一体化总是促进竞争，且行业越集中越可能促进竞争，对反垄断执法有参考价值。
We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze welfare effects of integration and the incentives to integrate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise.