The Market for Paintings in Paris between Rococo and Romanticism
利用18至19世纪巴黎拍卖数据，分析绘画价格受客观特征和艺术家去世的影响，发现法国大革命后价格下降，并揭示经销商通过形成圈子操纵拍卖的合谋行为。
Summary We analyze art pricing in a unique dataset on P aris auctions between 700s and 800s. Prices reflect the objective features of the paintings and of the sale, and they reveal a substantial death effect, with upward jumps in the years after the death of the artists. Both the hedonic and repeated sale price indexes show a declining pattern for the price of paintings (relative to the cost of living) starting with the F rench R evolution. On this basis, we analyze the emerging role and market power of art dealers and employ network theory to study whether they created rings to manipulate the outcome of the auctions for their profits. Dealers appear to have been divided into four main communities heavily trading between themselves and we find evidence of collusive behavior with lower hammer prices for buyers belonging to the same community of the dealers organizing the auction.