Governance Structure and Related Party Loan Guarantees: The Case of Chinese Family Business Groups
研究中国家族控制企业集团中，子公司对关联方提供贷款担保如何被家族用来侵占小股东利益，发现非家族董事长但家族高管任职的公司担保额更大，而家族董事长或非家族连锁董事长的公司则不然。
ABSTRACT Loan guarantees to related parties by affiliated subsidiaries within family controlled pyramids form a means by which the controlling family expropriates value from minority shareholders. The controlling family, however, will attempt to escape blame for the behavior. Using a sample of 1785 listed Chinese firms affiliated with family-controlled business groups, we explore how family governance structure affects the use of related party loan guarantees. As hypothesized, we find that affiliates with non-family chairmen, but with family directors or senior executives, issue larger volumes of loan guarantees to related parties, whereas affiliates with family chairmen and those with non-family interlocking chairmen do not. The behavior is moderated by regional institutional development.