Media versus Special Interests
论证了追求利润的媒体通过将新闻与娱乐结合，帮助克服选民的理性无知问题，从而在规制问题上部分抵消特殊利益集团的影响，并以20世纪初美国揭黑杂志对议员投票的影响为例进行实证。
We argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests.