Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations
研究分析师行为是否影响银行赢得承销业务的可能性，基于1993-2002年美国16,625笔债券和股票发行数据，发现分析师行为受经济激励影响，但未增加银行赢得承销的概率，主要决定因素是银行与发行人的既有承销和贷款关系。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether analyst behavior influenced banks' likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings in 1993–2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment banking relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending relationships, and the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the bank's decision to provide analyst coverage. Although analyst behavior was influenced by economic incentives, we find no evidence that aggressive analyst behavior increased their bank's probability of winning an underwriting mandate. The main determinant of the lead‐bank choice is the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships.