Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?
利用私募股权支持企业的独特数据，研究激励充分的董事会如何通过收集软信息来评估CEO能力，避免因运气或外部冲击而错误解雇CEO，并发现治理改革能提升监督效果，强制CEO更替可改善业绩。
ABSTRACT We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.