Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions
现金充裕的企业更倾向于发起收购,但这类收购会损害股东价值,每多持有一美元现金储备,收购方就损失七美分;现金充裕的收购方更易进行多元化收购,且其目标公司较少吸引其他竞标者,收购后经营业绩异常下滑,支持自由现金流代理成本假说。
ABSTRACT Cash‐rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash‐rich firms are value decreasing. Cash‐rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash‐rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash‐rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash‐rich firms.