Alternative Work Arrangements and Cost of Equity: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
利用日本劳动力市场放松管制这一准自然实验，研究发现制造业企业增加使用临时派遣工人后，股权成本显著下降，原因是劳动力成本灵活性提高降低了经营杠杆。
Abstract I examine whether firms’ use of alternative work arrangements, particularly temporary agency workers, affects their cost of equity. Exploiting a major labor-market deregulation in Japan that induced manufacturing firms to increase their employment of temporary agency workers, I show that the cost of equity decreased in manufacturing firms, relative to nonmanufacturing firms, after the deregulation. Further analysis using variations within manufacturing firms provides corroborating evidence. The rigidity in labor expenses and the cost of debt also decreased in manufacturing firms. Overall, alternative work arrangements increase the flexibility in labor costs, leading to lower operating leverage and cost of capital.