Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias
将投资组合的本土偏好理论与内部人所有权的公司金融理论结合，提出最优公司所有权理论来解释本土偏好，发现治理差的国家因内部人和国内监督股东的高持股导致外国组合投资少，而治理好的国家的外国直接投资者在治理差的国家有比较优势。
ABSTRACT We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.