Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
构建了一个多边契约模型，契约可随时间重谈并产生外部性。均衡存在且价值函数线性递增；若大联盟无效率，正外部性博弈会出现谈判延迟且效率损失不消失；若大联盟有效率则无延迟且有限步收敛至有效结果。
This paper proposes a model for multilateral contracting, where contracts are written and renegotiated over time, and where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. Equilibria always exist and the equilibrium value function is linear and monotonically increasing on the contracts. If the grand coalition, or contracting among all agents, is inefficient, we show that bargaining delays arise in positive-externality games and equilibrium inefficiency may remain bounded away from zero even as bargaining frictions converge to zero. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays, convergence to the grand coalition occurs in a finite number of contracting rounds, and the outcome becomes efficient as players become more patient. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.