An Experimental Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game: The Effect of Group Affiliation
实验发现，经理人通过不可信沟通诱导审计师产生自利偏差，但审计师所属群体的社会规范压力能消除这种偏差，质疑了审计师因与客户重复互动而无法公正审计的结论。
I report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the influence of noncredible communications and group affiliation on auditors' formation of self-serving bias. I find that manager-subjects use noncredible communications to induce auditors to develop an unwarranted trust of managers (i.e., a biased judgment). However, the bias is neutralized when auditor-subjects belong to groups that create social pressure to conform to group norms. Thus, my finding calls into question the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-serving biases resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients.