Short-Term Loans and Long-Term Relationships: Relationship Lending in Early America
利用19世纪美国银行的贷款记录，发现与银行保持长期关系的企业享有更低的信贷成本、更少的个人担保，且在信贷紧缩时更易重新协商贷款条款，支持了银行通过专有信息获取成本优势的理论。
Recent banking theory holds that durable firm-bank relationships are valuable to both parties. This paper uses the contract-specific loan records of a 19th-century U.S. bank and shows that firms with extended relationships received three principal benefits. First, firms with extended relationships had lower credit costs. Second, long-term customers provided fewer personal guarantees, which were an alternative to collateral. Third, long-term customers were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch. These findings support theories that banks realize cost advantages through the use of proprietary information.