PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS*
研究了竞争对管理效率的影响，区分了竞争的直接压力效应和代理效应，利用加拿大企业-员工匹配数据发现两种效应均显著，促使企业更重视质量改进、成本削减及合同激励。
We model the effects of competition on managerial efficiency and isolate the agency effect of competition, present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect of competition, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data that surveys both firms and their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance of these two effects. We find that competition has a significant direct pressure effect as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and cost reductions as well as on contractual incentives and employee effort.