Policy Uncertainty and Supply Adequacy in Electric Power Markets
研究了政策不确定性如何负面影响电力行业（发电和电网资产）的投资，指出政府干预预期、价格上限监管缺陷及监管承诺可信度问题，并预测回报率监管将重新兴起。
This paper examines policy uncertainty adversely affecting investment in the electric power industry, covering generation and network assets. We focus on asymmetric, systematic, non-diversifiable risk with spin-offs. In generation, a key uncertainty is the inability of governments to refrain from intervention if capacity becomes scarce and prices rise. The policy expectations can, in fact, be self-fulfilling. One issue in network investment is that price-cap regulation is less suited to handling market risk than rate-of-return regulation. Another issue is the apparent inability of regulators credibly to commit to pre-announced policy. With increasing importance of new investment, a case can be made that (used-and-useful) rate-of-return regulation will regain territory in the future. Furthermore, improving checks and balances within the structure of regulation should be a focus of policy and good governance.