School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation
研究了公立学校选择机制中的基数隔离现象，发现波士顿机制下风险规避程度不同的家庭会提交不同学校排序，导致隔离，而递延接受机制则能避免这一问题。
Abstract We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.