CEO Age, Risk Incentives, and Hedging Strategy
利用油气行业衍生品组合的手工数据，检验管理者偏好如何影响企业对冲策略，发现CEO年龄越大越可能对冲，临近退休的CEO偏好线性对冲工具，而凸性薪酬激励理论未获数据支持。
We test whether managerial preferences explain how firms hedge, using hand‐collected data on derivative portfolios in the oil and gas industry. How firms hedge involves choosing between linear contracts and put options, and deciding whether to finance these hedging positions with cash on hand or by selling call options. The likelihood of being a hedger increases with chief executive officer (CEO) age, and near‐retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data.