Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?
利用美国各州法律差异，研究发现单方离婚与均分财产法结合会提高家庭储蓄、降低女性就业，造成资产积累扭曲和资源向妻子转移；而婚前协议可减少扭曲。
This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples' intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed an equal division of property is associated with higher household savings and lower female employment, implying a distortion in household assets accumulation and a transfer toward wives whose share in household resources is smaller than the one of their husband. When spouses share consumption equally, separate property or prenuptial agreements can reduce distortions and increase equity.