The State-Dependent Effectiveness of Hiring Subsidies
研究发现招聘补贴在经济衰退时效果较差，因为此时接近招聘门槛的企业少，而接近裁员门槛的企业多；相反，保护就业的补贴在衰退时更有效。
The responsiveness of job creation to shocks is procyclical, while the responsiveness of job destruction is countercyclical. This new finding can be explained by a heterogeneous-firm model in which hiring costs lead to lumpy employment adjustment. The model predicts that policies that aim to stimulate employment by encouraging job creation, such as hiring subsidies, are significantly less effective in recessions: these are times when few firms are near their hiring thresholds and many firms are near their firing thresholds. Policies that target the job destruction margin, such as employment protection subsidies, are particularly effective at such times.