Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
构建了一个多企业行业的logit需求模型，研究在位企业如何通过设定接入费来影响竞争和进入，发现价格竞争下接入费低于成本，而效用竞争下有效率；在位企业可能通过提高接入费完全阻止进入。
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008.