History-Bound Reelections
提出一种历史绑定连任机制，要求现任者必须达到自己以往最高得票率才能连任，通过三时期模型证明该规则能减少现任者偏好放纵、确保有能力的官员连任，并改善社会福利。
We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a “ score-replication rule.” Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.