Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
用搜索均衡模型分析失业保险的最优设计，发现最优方案是失业期间福利递减，且从统一福利转向差异化福利可带来显著福利提升。
Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline (or increase) over a worker's unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.