No news is good news: voluntary disclosure in the face of litigation
研究了公司价值随时间随机变化时，诉讼风险如何抑制正面披露、减少低效披露政策，并发现更严格的法律环境可能有效促进资本市场信息传递，尤其当信息具有专有性时。
We study disclosure dynamics when the firm value evolves stochastically over time. The presence of litigation risk, arising from the failure to disclose unfavorable information, crowds out positive disclosures. Litigation risk mitigates firms' tendency to use inefficient disclosure policies. From a policy perspective, we show that a stricter legal environment may be an efficient way to stimulate information transmission in capital markets, particularly when the nature of information is proprietary. We model the endogeneity of litigation risk in a dynamic setting and shed light on the empirical controversy regarding whether disclosure preempts or triggers litigation.