The Fragility of Commitment
研究发现，在许多标准博弈中，当追随者观察领导者行动的成本很小时，承诺的价值消失，均衡收益与行动不可观察时相同。该结果适用于斯塔克尔伯格-古诺和差异化产品伯特兰博弈，而有限理性模型可恢复承诺的价值。
We show that the value of commitment is fragile in many standard games. When the follower faces a small cost to observe the leader's action, equilibrium payoffs are identical to the case where the leader's actions are unobservable. Applications of our result include standard Stackelberg–Cournot and differentiated product Bertrand games, as well as forms of indirect commitment, highlighted in Bulow et al. [Bulow J, Geanakoplos J, Klemperer P (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and strategic complements. J. Political Econom. 93:488–511]. Weakening full rationality in favor of boundedly rational solution concepts such as quantal-response equilibrium restores the value of commitment. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.