Information Invariance in Variable‐Population Social‐Choice Problems
研究在人口可变的社会选择问题中，如何扩展森关于个人效用可测性和人际可比性的信息假设，发现避免不可能结果需要比固定人口框架更强的信息条件，并基于信息假设刻画了可变人口社会福利排序。
We examine the possibilities of extending Sen's taxonomy of fixed‐population information assumptions regarding the measurability and interpersonal comparability of individual utilities to social‐choice problems where the population may vary. It is shown that in order to avoid impossibility results, informationally more demanding assumptions than in the fixed‐population framework are required. We provide characterizations of variable‐population social‐welfare orderings based on information assumptions, and we suggest a way of generating the required informational environment by means of norms that impose a domain restriction on the set of possible utility profiles.